


~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/SAVA / WIND 710605



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS


Week Ending 5 June 1971

NSA Declassification/Release instructions on File.


For the President Only

~~Top Secret~~

SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS


1968-1971
Weekly average for each monthMARCH 1971 - JUNE 1971
Weekly data as reported

US BATTLE DEATHS




dropped sharply to 19 from the previous week's 48.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS




rose to 307 from the 262 of last week. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.

INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE




stand at two battalion-size and seven small, special purpose groups totaling 826 personnel. The estimate of infiltrators destined for South Vietnam/Cambodia since 1 October 1970 is now some 67,600 - 69,600.

ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS




decreased from last week's 687 to 646.

ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION



increased slightly to 1,878 from the 1,866 of last week.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS



as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces increased one point to 90%.

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

In the northern half of South Vietnam, the Communists took fairly heavy casualties as they increased their attacks by fire and ground probes below the DMZ, south of Danang, and in the central highlands. This pattern of activity in the northern provinces and the highlands is expected to continue as the enemy reacts to ARVN operations and attempts to apply pressure on fire support bases. The relatively high level of Communist activity in the highlands may well continue through the summer as an unusually large number of infiltrators destined for this sector, plus three possible organic artillery battalions, have been detected in the pipeline. These southward moving reinforcements are apparently intended to augment Communist forces in the northern part of South Vietnam and to replace the Communists' heavy casualties of recent weeks.

In Laos, friendly forces are regrouping after an enemy counter-attack which drove them from positions northeast of Luang Prabang. Bouam Long, north of the Plain of Jars (PDJ), remains under limited siege. Below the Plain, Vang Pao's irregulars met little resistance as they moved onto the PDJ in the first phase of a 16-battalion operation designed to force the Communists from areas south and west of the PDJ. In the Panhandle, action was light with neither side engaging in any significant offensive moves.

During the past week in Cambodia, sharp fighting occurred 10-15 miles northeast of Phnom Penh, the closest any major Communist force has been to the capital since the beginning of the war. Direct contact with the enemy has lessened but the Cambodians are still encountering resistance in their attempts to reinforce and supply their forces as well as evacuate their casualties. The South Vietnamese have completed their withdrawal from the Snuol area and the remainder of the country was comparatively quiet this week.

Enemy Infiltration

The detection during the past week of two regular and seven small, special purpose groups raises the estimate of personnel moving toward South Vietnam/Cambodia since 1 October 1970 to some 67,600 - 69,600. Gaps in the sequential numbering pattern suggest that five other regular groups are probably also in the system which would increase the estimate by 2,500 to 3,000 men. Virtually all such gaps which had been accepted earlier as "gap fills" have now been detected in Laos, thus strengthening our confidence in the estimates of infiltration rates.

South Vietnam Developments

President Thieu's success in reinstating in the presidential election bill a clause designed to limit the number of candidates has added a new element of uncertainty to the race. Candidates must now be endorsed by 40 National Assemblymen (of 197) or 100 (of 554) provincial or municipal councillors. Originally conceived to eliminate a profusion of candidates and make it possible for Thieu to receive a majority mandate, the operative clause seems to have been pushed through by Thieu's supporters in order to eliminate Vice President Ky as a candidate. Ky has admitted [REDACTED] he can probably count on only 24 Assemblymen and from 50 to 75 of the councillors. He hopes, therefore, to arrange with Big Minh for some of Minh's provincial supporters to endorse him. While a Ky candidacy would improve Minh's chances, there is some doubt, even if Minh agrees, that a sufficient number of councillors would be willing to risk their political future by signing for Ky.

Communist Developments

The word appears to be spreading among Communist cadres in the Delta that the Viet Cong are to vote for Big Minh. In spite of Big Minh's repeated and vigorous denials that he advocates neutralism or a coalition government, the Communists apparently are hoping that, if elected President, he may possibly prove to be malleable in this regard. Sources privy to VC provincial and district level organizations in two

Delta provinces have recently reported that party cadres were briefed earlier this spring to the effect that COSVN has decided to support Big Minh's candidacy. These reports are not the first alleging Communist support for Minh nor will they be the last as the election campaign gets underway.

~~Top Secret~~